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Modeling Risk-based Pension Insurance Premiums 
Martin G. Clarke 
1. Introduction and Summary 
This paper describes how the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in the U.K. quantifies and 
prices the risks it carries. We also discuss how the PPF interprets these outcomes in terms of 
a levy or premium to be charged to the pension plans that it protects. 
PPF has been in existence only since April 2005, but it has experienced rapid growth as a 
consequence of the failure of pension scheme sponsors in the U.K. and the persistent 
underfunding of their pension plans. The entity has so far withstood the global financial 
crisis, maintaining a strong financial position despite the hazardous economic climate. Part of 
that success lies in the Fund’s ability to charge a levy consistent with the risks that the Fund 
faces and its skill in securing stakeholder acceptance of the process by which it does this. 
In establishing the PPF, U.K. legislators considered the experience of and lessons learned 
from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the United States. Foremost 
amongst those learnings was the need for greater flexibility and independent control of the 
levy. Indeed the PPF was able to introduce the world’s first risk-based pension protection 
levy, a key step in winning stakeholder support for the pricing mechanism. The PPF levy is 
currently £630m or approximately a 5 basis point charge on scheme liabilities. 
The components of the levy-setting process are described in this paper, along with the 
history and growth of the PPF as well as its legislative function. We also review the PPF’s 
Funding Strategy, which is the context in which strategic decisions are made by the Board of 
the PPF. In establishing a clear funding objective – namely to be self-sufficient by 2030 – the 
Board has a publicly declared goal against which its progress can be tracked and its needs for 
financial resources evaluated. Without such a structure, the PPF believes there would be 
much less acceptance of the levy requirements within its stakeholder community. We also 
 
2 
 
review the framework whereby investment and levy strategies can be evaluated in the context 
of the PPF’s long term objectives, and describe the internal model at high level to compute 
measures of success of different strategies. In a separate exercise the Board has set its risk 
appetites and agreed a minimum level of long term security against its funding target in much 
the same way that a financial company (bank or insurer) would do to optimize its capital 
usage. The sensitivity analysis of the results that the PPF derives each year helps the Board 
assess changes to its levy needs. As well as shifts in the risk landscape, the Board has been 
able to use this framework to assess the impact of a change to the basis of indexation of PPF 
compensation (from Retail Prices Index to Consumer Prices Index), the cost of removing its 
compensation cap and the effect of a potential change in pension scheme funding valuations 
to permit smoothing of discount rates. 
The PPF’s internal model is a stochastic tool that encompasses the main financial and 
economic risks faced by the Fund. It incorporates many behavioral assumptions such as the 
rate of closure of defined benefit plans and the shift over time to less risky investment 
strategies. The model produces distributions of outcomes and allows the Board to understand 
both the expected outturn and the range of possibilities. Such output is used by the Board to 
inform its periodic decisions about the size of the PPF levy, using risk-based and scheme-
based elements. 
We conclude our discussion with a review of four lessons from the U.K. experience that 
may be applicable to the PBGC in the United States. 
 
2. The Pension Protection Fund 
The PPF was created in response to concerns about the fate of members of 
underfunded defined benefit (DB) pension schemes should the scheme sponsor become 
insolvent. In 2002 and 2003, publicity around cases such as Allied Steel and Wire highlighted 
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the growing number of instances in which employees in these circumstances were left with 
very much lower levels of pension than expected. This contributed to what many described as 
a “pension crisis” undermining public confidence in final salary pension schemes in the U.K. 
The idea of a Central Discontinuance Fund had been considered by the Pension Law 
Review Committee a decade previously but it was not considered appropriate to pursue the 
idea at that time. But in 2003 the Government decided to act, announcing its plans in a 
Pensions White Paper to create the PPF in order to provide compensation for members of 
private sector, defined benefit pension schemes which wound up on the employers’ 
insolvency with insufficient assets to meet their liabilities. The 2003 White Paper culminated 
in the Pensions Act 2004, and in April 2005 the PPF was formed. 
Figure 1 here 
Established as a Statutory Corporation, the PPF is run by a Board that is independent 
of the U.K. Government. Powers conferred on the Board give it responsibility inter alia for 
managing the calculation and application of the Pension Protection Levy and setting the 
Fund’s investment strategy. A primary driver for conferring these powers on the Board was 
to ensure that the activities of the PPF would be independent of, and not have to be 
underwritten by, the Government and ultimately taxpayers.  
Broadly speaking, the PPF provides two levels of compensation to pension plan 
participants. For individuals that have reached their scheme’s normal pension age or, 
irrespective of age, are either already in receipt of survivor’s pension or a pension on the 
grounds of ill health, the PPF will generally pay 100 percent of the pension in payment 
immediately before the insolvency event. For the majority of people under their scheme’s 
normal pension age, the PPF will generally pay 90 percent of the pension the individual had 
accrued (including revaluation) immediately before the insolvency event. The individual’s 
compensation is revalued in line with the increase in inflation as measured by the Consumer 
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Prices Index (CPI) between the assessment date and the commencement of compensation 
payments. This revaluation is subject to a cap of 5 percent compound per annum in respect of 
compensation attributable to pensionable service prior to 6 April 2009, and a cap of 2.5 
percent compound per annum in respect of compensation attributable to pensionable service 
on or after 6 April 2009. 
Compensation for plan participants is subject to an overall annual cap. In April 2012, 
this cap was £30,644.85 at age 65 after application of the 90 percent factor, with the cap 
being adjusted according to the age at which compensation comes into payment. Once 
compensation is in payment (for either category of member), the part that derives from 
pensionable service on or after 6 April 1997 is indexed each year in line with CPI inflation 
capped at 2.5 percent.  
While the PPF has the ability to alter the Pension Protection Levy (subject to certain 
statutory limits) to meet its liabilities, in extreme circumstances it can also reduce 
compensation. First, revaluation and indexation can be reduced by the PPF. Second, levels of 
compensation can be reduced by the Secretary of State on the recommendation of the Board 
of the PPF. To date, the PPF has not articulated the circumstances in which these powers 
might be exercised and for the purpose of its financial management such scenarios are not 
explicitly modeled. 
In order to fulfill its broader statutory objectives, the PPF must have sufficient funds 
to pay compensation to the members it protects. The agency’s revenue currently derives from 
four sources: the assets of pension schemes that transfer into the Fund, recoveries from the 
insolvent sponsoring employers of those schemes, the annual Pension Protection Levy, and 
returns on invested assets. Table 1 shows the development of the PPF balance sheet in the 
eight years 2005/2006 to 2012/2013. 
Table 1 here 
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In the above table, the funding ratio is based on the assets and liabilities of the Fund, 
measured according to PPF valuation assumptions. These data include those of schemes in 
assessment that are anticipated to transfer to the Fund. Claims are measured in terms of the 
deficits of schemes entering an assessment period in the relevant year, in accordance with the 
actuarial basis set under the terms of Section 179 of the Pensions Act 2004. 
Although short term prospects for the PPF may be challenging owing to the current 
global economic climate, the long term decline in private sector DB provision and the 
influence of regulation towards improved funding levels both tend to suggest that the risk to 
the PPF balance sheet is likely to diminish over time. A number of factors are likely to 
contribute to this, including regulatory intervention, a move to liability-driven investment, 
and the overall decline in the number of schemes as they transfer their liabilities to the 
insurance regime, enter the PPF, or otherwise become ineligible for PPF protection. 
Against this background, the PPF recognizes that there will come a point in time 
when the Fund is unable to rely on surviving schemes to amortize any deficit it may have 
accrued. The PPF’s current objective therefore is to become self-sufficient by 2030.  
 
3. Funding strategy 
The PPF’s financial operating model. Most financial firms have clear objectives around 
which they build their business strategies and track performance. In the case of the PPF, its 
stated vision is “To protect peoples’ futures” and its mission is “To pay the right people the 
right amount at the right time.” A number of financial objectives might be congruent with 
these statements. The PPF Board’s objective is to fulfill its vision and mission, taking into 
account the totality of the PPF financial model, namely its assets and liabilities from both past 
and future claims, and its levy income. 
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The PPF’s financial operating model is illustrated in Figure 2 This shows the flows of 
money into the Fund and the outputs from the investment processes, being the compensation 
payable to former members of pension schemes that have transferred into the PPF.  
Figure 2 here 
The PPF financial objective is self-sufficiency. It is inevitable that the PPF will continue to 
experience failure of scheme sponsors and consequently future claims. A claim is quantified 
by the PPF as the size of the scheme’s deficit as of the date of insolvency, measured 
according to the PPF’s published Section 179 valuation guidance and assumptions. In 
particular, it should be noted that the Section 179 deficit is assessed by reference to PPF 
compensation levels rather than the full benefits under the scheme’s rules. It is however 
likely that the impact of claims on the Fund will decline over time, because: 
• The long term expectation is that pension scheme funding will improve on account of the 
efforts of trustees, sponsors, and the Pensions Regulator; 
• Schemes are expected to participate increasingly in risk mitigation strategies such as 
funding triggers, and interest rate and longevity hedging; 
• Current activity points to growth in pension buy-out and buy-in activity that reduces risk 
to the Fund. It is expected that the market capacity for liability de-risking will increase 
over the coming years from its present level; and 
• The trend towards closure of schemes to new entrants and new accrual is expected to 
continue, as is the increasing preference for defined contribution schemes as the solution 
to employer-sponsored pension provision. 
There are, of course, scenarios where these expectations might not be met and which 
must be included in any financial analysis of the PPF. Nevertheless, over a long period, the 
expected decline in the scale of claims on the Fund is likely to lead to a point when the off-
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balance-sheet risks (namely the risks associated with future claims on the Fund) are much 
less significant than the on-balance sheet risks.  
Any funding shortfall experienced by the PPF at that time would become a significant 
burden on the remaining levy payers. Furthermore, as the level of risk in the eligible defined 
benefit universe shrinks over time, it would be desirable for the Pension Protection Levy to 
reduce in proportion. Indeed, the PPF New Levy Framework introduced from 2012/2013 
onwards has a “bottom up” principle, in which the levy payable by an individual scheme is 
closely related to that scheme’s own risk characteristics. It would be unsatisfactory if, several 
years hence, a large levy needed to be raised to deal with a substantial PPF shortfall at a time 
when the base of levy-paying schemes had shrunk considerably and almost all of them were 
well funded.  
The PPF therefore believes that there needs to be a Funding Horizon by which time 
the PPF should be “self-sufficient”. 
What is meant by self-sufficiency? The use of the term “self-sufficiency” is becoming 
increasingly common in pensions work. It is important, however, that the term is carefully 
defined to avoid misunderstanding. In the context of its Financial Objective, the PPF has 
defined “self-sufficiency” to mean having sufficient assets to cover liabilities without the 
need to take future risk for which future levies would be required, specifically: 
• Being fully funded on a reasonably risk-free measure of liabilities; 
• Having removed exposure to interest rate and inflation risk as far as possible; 
• Having removed exposure to financial market risk as far as possible; and 
• Having acquired protection against residual risks such as longevity and residual 
insolvency risk. 
Self-sufficiency therefore implies that the PPF would no longer need to raise levies in 
order to maintain its funding position. The use of the phrase “reasonably risk free” recognizes 
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that there are no truly risk free assets, so it means that the Fund at that point in time would 
not need to take additional investment risk. In practice, this means a mark to market valuation 
of the liabilities, by reference to a notional portfolio of assets consisting of cash plus 
appropriate zero-coupon interest rate swaps contracts and inflation swaps contracts plus gilt 
strips (or notional gilt strips). In order to achieve this target, it is the PPF’s intention to 
remove risk gradually over a period of time, using market instruments where available and 
cost-effective. 
The alternative to this strategy is to allow risk to the PPF balance sheet to persist in 
the long term. This may lead to a potentially lower levy in the run-up to the end of the 
Funding Horizon but with increased probability of a sizeable deficit thereafter. This, in turn, 
could necessitate substantial levies on schemes still extant beyond the Funding Horizon, 
should investment, longevity, or credit conditions prove adverse.  
The funding horizon. The PPF has considered how it should quantify the expected decline 
in the risk of insolvency and at what point to draw the line in terms of setting a funding 
target. The deliberations of the PPF Board in 2010 concluded that 20 years was an 
appropriate timescale to aim for (i.e. the year 2030), although it accepted that there was an 
element of subjectivity in this choice. 
The length of the Funding Horizon is important in ensuring the Pension Protection 
Levy follows a balanced and stable trajectory over time. A short horizon may lead to the PPF 
charging excessive levy over the short term, as it aims for the Fund to become self-sufficient 
in the face of persistent financial risk. On the other hand, an extended horizon would increase 
the likelihood of the Fund falling short of self-sufficiency at a point where there remains little 
potential for continued levy. 
It is important to note that self-sufficiency is only a target for the year 2030. During 
the funding period, the PPF must accept the risk of further claims, and it has determined that 
 
9 
 
it will assume a certain amount of investment risk during this period. This strategy serves to 
mitigate the impact on the Pension Protection Levy, through the expectation of investment 
returns in excess of the “risk-free” rate. 
The PPF Board chose the 20-year horizon after considering the following factors: 
• The maturing profile of its liabilities; 
• The expected decline in its exposure to the effects of sponsor insolvencies; and 
• The decreasing size of the eligible universe of levy payers. 
In broad terms, the Board considered that the risk to the PPF, both within and outside the 
Fund, was likely to be much diminished by 2030, and this was the primary reason for the 
choice of 2030 as the Funding Horizon. 
Owing to the closure of many schemes to new entrants and accruals, and especially 
those schemes most likely to be candidates for PPF entry in future, the duration of PPF 
liabilities is expected to shorten over the same timescale. This gave further support to a 
strategy that aims to focus solely on matching the liabilities rather than taking investment risk 
after a point in time. Figure 3 below shows the maturing profile of PPF liabilities.1 It is 
projected that by 2030: 
• The average age of DB scheme members will have increased from 56 to 71 (pensioner 
average age rising from 68 to 76, non-pensioner average age moving from 47 to 59); and 
• Around 70 percent of scheme members will be pensioners, up from around 40 percent 
today. 
As a result, the duration of the Fund’s liabilities is expected to reduce from 21 years to 12 
years. This facilitates the matching of compensation payments using conventional investment 
1 The spike at around age 65 is also reflected in population statistics and is partly explained 
by the post-war baby boom. 
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techniques, as a smaller proportion of liabilities is projected to fall outside the term of long-
dated gilts. 
Figure 3 here 
Claims and scheme membership projections therefore point to a much improved risk 
environment for the PPF balance sheet in 2030. If the Fund arrives at this date in a sound 
funding position, with assets that match its liabilities as far as possible and with arrangements 
in place to protect it from residual risks, there should only be a low risk of the Fund failing to 
meet its financial obligations. A 20-year period from 2010 has therefore been set as the 
horizon over which the Board will seek to achieve a resilient balance sheet. 
While the PPF has stated an intention to target self-sufficiency over a 20-year horizon, 
this timeframe is not considered by the Board to be immutable. A shorter time horizon than 
2030 would be appropriate if risks to the PPF were much reduced at an earlier juncture. On 
the other hand, stressed economic conditions and persistent risk could imply an extension of 
the Funding Horizon beyond 2030. 
Protecting against residual longevity and unexpected claims risk. Risk to the PPF balance 
sheet will not be entirely eliminated by 2030. The Fund aims to remove market, interest rate, 
and inflation risk using appropriate investment techniques. Nevertheless, the risk of 
unexpectedly high claims and member longevity is likely to persist. The Fund will also need 
to deal with operational hazards, such as the risk of counterparty insolvency and the risk of an 
expense overrun. The materiality of counterparty risk undoubtedly requires further analysis 
and monitoring. The possibility of an expense overrun also requires monitoring and will 
become more material when the Fund reaches maturity. 
It may be possible to protect against a proportion of residual longevity and 
unexpected claims risk. Instruments to hedge longevity, for instance, are already available. 
But the markets providing insurance against these residual risks remain at a relatively early 
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stage of development, compared to the pool of potentially insurable liabilities. The Fund’s 
liabilities are expected to grow substantially to 2030. It is currently unclear whether such 
markets will be sufficiently large and sophisticated to absorb the full extent of PPF claims 
and longevity risk. The PPF therefore considers it prudent to target a Funding Margin above 
best-estimate liabilities in order to protect against these residual risks. At the same time, it 
recognizes that it must balance the interests of different generations of levy payers and 
members in determining the size of this margin.  
In order to identify a suitable margin, the Board considered stochastic modeling of 
longevity and claims using the PPF’s own internal model (the Long-Term Risk Model, 
described below). The first step was to produce an expected PPF and scheme profile at 2030 
using model output, credit transition matrices, and current mortality tables. A range of 
scenarios was then generated for insolvencies over five years and longevity over the 
outstanding lifetime of the Fund. This was applied to the expected PPF and scheme profile at 
2030, providing a set of outcomes for claims and PPF funding. From these outcomes, it was 
possible to examine the protection against combined longevity and claims risk provided by 
various sizes of reserve. The estimated relationship between the size of margin and the extent 
of protection is illustrated below in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 here 
The PPF is targeting a Funding Margin equivalent to 10 percent of liabilities to 
protect, with 90 percent confidence, against unexpected claims over five years and longevity 
over the outstanding lifetime of the Fund. This target will not be static over time, however; it 
will be re-evaluated against changing economic and demographic circumstances. A useful 
comparator for the 10 percent margin is the embryonic IORP solvency initiative in Europe 
which, though unlikely to be realized for many years, proposes an eight percent solvency 
capital margin above the value of the liabilities for pension funds.  
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4. Funding framework 
The risk return trade-off for the PPF. The number, size, and shortfall in respect of those 
schemes that enter the PPF are beyond the PPF’s control, but the investment strategy and the 
size of the levy that the PPF seeks to raise are clearly within its control. The PPF’s Funding 
Framework is a useful tool with which a range of decisions, including those related to levy 
and investment strategies, can be evaluated. Such a framework also represents a rational basis 
for communicating with key stakeholders. 
Development of the PPF Funding Framework has leaned heavily on the language and 
principles applied to both pension funds and insurance undertakings. For example, Urwin et 
al. (2001) refer to the financial mission of a pension fund including key financial goals; 
secondary financial goals and the risk measure. And in the insurance context, Shaw et al. 
(2010) note the main components of economic capital to be risk measure; probability 
threshold and time horizon, the most well-known examples of which are the one-year 99.5% 
Value at Risk (VaR) found in insurance. 
The PPF’s probability threshold is in effect a guideline probability of reaching the 
Financial Objective over the Funding Horizon. This was established in 2010 when the PPF 
Board expressed comfort with a probability of reaching the Financial Objective over 20 years 
of 80 percent, known as the “probability of success.” In reaching this position, which was 
also subject to informal stakeholder consultation and subsequent exposure through the 
publication of the Funding Strategy, the Board had to accept that success cannot be 
guaranteed under a principle that the possibility of any adjustment to compensation levels or 
indexation would not be formally incorporated into its financial planning. 
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In order to be able to express its appetite for financial risk and to provide a 
quantification that will facilitate analysis of risk return trade-offs, the PPF has selected two 
risk measures: 
• A downside risk measure (sometimes referred to as drawdown) being the maximum 
deficit reached by the Fund under the 90th percentile adverse scenario. It is a 
comprehensive measure that combines both the insurance risks of future claims on the 
Fund and the asset and liability risks of the Fund’s annuity book. The measure reflects the 
near worst case scenario where the Fund may inherit potentially irrecoverable deficits and 
is used to inform the Board on strategic levy and investment decisions; and 
• The second risk measure is the volatility of the funding level assuming no further claims 
on the Fund. This measure reflects short term uncertainty in the PPF’s own funding level 
and is used to express the Board’s appetite for investment and funding risk and to inform 
more detailed day to day investment decisions. 
The sensitivity of the downside risk and probability of success measures to controllable 
factors such as investment strategy and levy collections, and to key assumptions such as 
current scheme and the PPF funding levels, is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 here 
As noted above, the practical risk return trade-offs available to the PPF center on the 
investment and levy strategies of the Fund. Under a new policy introduced for the 2012/2013 
year, levy parameters are now set triennially following an analysis of the Funding 
Framework. In addition to the quantitative outputs such as those from the internal model 
within the Funding Framework, the Board will also consider qualitative issues such as the 
balance between protection and affordability of the PPF levy.  
  
 
14 
 
5. PPF’s Internal Model 
The PPF’s Long-Term Risk Model. Internal models are more commonly associated with 
risk capital assessments within insurance entities. Although the PPF is not a capitalized entity 
like an insurance company, an internal model can nevertheless help to assess the full extent 
and range of risk that the PPF faces. Such assessments are vital to a number of core PPF 
decisions, most notably those on the total Pension Protection Levy and on the design of an 
appropriate investment strategy.  
The PPF has developed a model capable of capturing, quantifying and expressing the 
potential impact of all primary risks to the PPF balance sheet: the so-called Long-Term Risk 
Model (LTRM). The LTRM is a stochastic claims and balance sheet model that generates an 
extensive range of asset return, insolvency and longevity scenarios over a chosen time 
horizon, and on this basis projects a distribution of possible PPF balance sheet outcomes. 
The projection process begins with the generation of 1,000 economic scenarios. Each 
economic scenario is a set of projected paths for relevant asset prices (including bond yields, 
equity prices and risk-free rates). These are obtained from a third party supplied Economic 
Scenario Generator (ESG). The largest PPF-eligible pension schemes are modeled 
individually, with the remaining schemes pooled into groups according to demographic and 
risk similarities. 
To capture insolvency risk, the PPF models pension scheme sponsors transitioning 
each year between eight different credit ratings, ranging from AA to D (where D constitutes a 
default). The probability of transitioning to a given credit rating depends on the sponsor’s 
current rating, its industry sector, the current state of the economy, and the company’s own 
idiosyncratic risk. This latter element reflects the fact that companies face their own unique 
risks that are uncorrelated with their industry and the wider economy. The PPF uses 500 
different scenarios of idiosyncratic risk. Each of the 500 risk scenarios is mapped to each of 
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the 1,000 economic scenarios (providing 500,000 scenarios in all); with the insolvency 
dynamics adjusted to reflect the degree of stress at play in the economy. Funding paths 
therefore combine with insolvency dynamics to determine the profile and size of claims on 
the Fund (see Figure 5).  
Figure 5 here. 
PPF assets and liabilities are rolled forward under each scenario, taking account of 
investment returns and movements in the discount rate. It is assumed that the PPF balance 
sheet is unaffected by changes to interest and inflation rates owing to the Fund’s policy of 
hedging out these risks. The funding of schemes in the PPF-eligible universe is rolled 
forward in a similar manner. These deficits are transferred onto the PPF balance sheet at the 
point at which they occur. Levy collections are also modeled explicitly, taking into account 
the main features of the PPF’s New Levy Framework, for example the way that funding risk 
varies under different economic scenarios. The result is a distribution of PPF balance sheet 
outcomes over a chosen horizon that takes account of all primary funding risks. Figure 6 
shows the distribution of balance sheet outcomes from the Fund’s 31 March 2012 base case. 
Figure 6 here 
The value of liabilities at any particular time step is expressed in terms consistent with 
the contemporaneous market parameters (such as interest rates and inflation assumptions) 
which underlie the market value of the assets. The PPF uses a stochastic mortality model that 
allows for rates of mortality improvement to vary in different scenarios. The table currently 
used is generated by the Cairns-Blake-Dowd (2007) mortality model with the cohort and 
curvature effects.  
Modeling assumptions and limitations. In projecting forward the PPF balance sheet, the 
LTRM models the behavior of asset returns and scheme sponsor insolvencies. Modeling 
techniques are insufficient, however, to capture many of the additional dynamics affecting 
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pension scheme risk, especially those relating to “scheme behavior”. In these cases, 
subjective assumptions are used, a selection of which includes the following: 
• Scheme contributions are determined in accordance with current recovery plans, as 
reported to the Pensions Regulator; 
• Schemes reduce the risk of their investments over time (migrating on average to 85 
percent allocation to long-dated bonds); and 
• No new schemes become eligible for PPF protection. 
Where assumptions such as the above are material to the risk assessments or decisions being 
made, it is important that their choice is appropriately governed and that the effect of these 
choices is explored. In the case of the PPF, key model assumptions are set at the Board level 
and their impact assessed through the use of sensitivities. 
The internal model is not subject to uniformly-applied assumptions regarding the risk 
premia for investment in equity or other return-seeking asset classes. Instead, as noted above, 
asset returns are generated stochastically by the ESG. Observed data and current market 
information inform long-term averages around which stochastic projections fluctuate. In the 
projections carried out at an effective date of 31 March 2012, the risk-free investment return, 
in this case the short-term return on cash stabilizes at a long-term average of around 5 percent 
per annum, with an average risk premium for equity investment of around 3.5 percent per 
annum. Sponsor insolvency probabilities are assumed to exhibit a degree of correlation with 
equity market conditions.  
For the modeling of interest rates, there is an implicit assumption of mean reversion 
which could disguise the exposure to extreme and historically unprecedented market 
scenarios. Since these seemingly unlikely scenarios may represent significant financial risks 
to the Fund, their effect should be explored through further analysis. Stress testing of the key 
risk metrics is carried out using assumptions devised from economic analysis of potential 
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future scenarios of the world economy. These stress tests are used to study the resilience of 
the Fund to various shocks, identify exposures and assist with the planning of mitigations. 
 As with any financial or economic model, it is important to exercise appropriate 
caution when analyzing LTRM output. Economic models are not infallible; there is no 
guarantee that future outcomes will conform to dynamics observed in present and past data. 
In order to minimize the risk of misleading output, care must be taken to review and update 
the model on a regular basis and to reconcile its results to previous output and known 
outcomes.  
 
6. Pricing and Sharing the Risk 
Overview of the PPF charging mechanism. The Pension Protection Levy is determined in 
two steps. First, the Board determines the aggregate amount of levy funding that it wishes to 
collect. This amount is then divided up between schemes according to their risk for the 
estimated Risk-Based Levy (RBL) component, and according to their size for the estimated 
Scheme-Based Levy (SBL) component. Prior to the 2012/2013 levy year this was an annual 
exercise This approach was, to a large extent, a “top-down” charging mechanism in that an 
individual scheme levy was a function of the total to be collected and that scheme’s risk 
characteristics relative to the general population.  
 The PPF Board moved to a triennial cycle from 2012/2013 onwards. Under the new 
arrangement, the levy parameters are fixed for the three years so that levy payers have greater 
predictability of costs during that period (though the system has less predictability of levy 
income). During each three-year period, therefore, the levy will be “bottom-up” whereby an 
individual scheme’s levy depends solely on that scheme’s individual risk factors and the 
aggregate levy will be the sum of the individual levies. This new framework has several 
features: 
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• Parameters of the levy formula are fixed for at least three years so that individual levies 
move in line with individual scheme risk; 
• The impact of market volatility is reduced by a smoothing mechanism and there is an 
allowance for individual schemes’ investment risk in the calculation of the underfunding 
level; 
• Emphasis is shifted away from insolvency risk towards underfunding risk, with a 
compression in the scale of insolvency probabilities and the number of levy bands 
reduced from 100 to 10; and 
• The levy rates themselves include a margin to accord more closely to market pricing 
levels, with the result that the range in rates between strong and weak sponsors is much 
narrower.  
Setting the levy estimate. In setting its levy requirements, the PPF Board is mindful of 
remaining on track to achieve its funding objective by the end of its chosen Funding Horizon 
in 2030. The Board has expressed a level of comfort for the probability of achieving this 
objective set at 80% in 2010, but which is expected to gradually increase and converge to 
100% by 2030. The levy decision is informed by analysis from the internal model described 
previously, together with appropriate sensitivity and scenario analyses. In particular, one of 
the outputs of the model is the probability of achieving the PPF’s Funding Objective. In 
addition to the quantitative information and mindful of the limitations of models, the Board 
exercises considerable judgment and takes into account a wide range of qualitative factors in 
making a levy decision.  
 The Pension Protection Levy cannot, under the Act, exceed a Levy Ceiling initially 
fixed by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions; it is now indexed annually in line with 
National Average Earnings. For the 2012/2013 levy year the ceiling was £934m. The 
Pensions Act also specifies a 25% cap on any year-on-year increase in the levy estimate. 
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Indeed following the first year of the new levy arrangement, in which the level of risk 
through underfunding rose dramatically as long bond yields hit historic lows, the Board had 
to intervene to restrain the increase in the levy estimate to ensure continued affordability. 
Sharing the PPF levy among schemes. The PPF Levy comprises a “Risk-Based Levy” 
(RBL), based on individual scheme risk factors, and a “Scheme-Based Levy” (SBL) which 
depends only on the size of the scheme and is set in proportion to scheme liabilities on a 
Section 179 basis. The estimated SBL must not represent more than 20% of the estimated 
total levy collection. In effect the SBL is a cross-subsidy of the levy of small schemes by 
larger ones, and the PPF has stated that it will be set at a level to cover only the cost of any 
capping of the RBL that may be made on grounds of affordability. 
 The Pensions Act requires the Board to take at least two risk factors into account in 
the calculation of the RBL, namely underfunding and insolvency risk. The Board may also 
take investment risk into account and, from 2012/2013, it has begun to do so by basing its 
formula on values of assets and liabilities that are stressed according to an adverse investment 
scenario. 
Figure 7 here 
 
7. Conclusions 
 Here we provide an explanation of the PPF levy-setting process, explain the 
framework around which the levy decisions are made, and outline the success measures 
designed to show the robustness of the Fund on a prospective basis. Some of the 
methodology was derived from the insurance sector, but the PPF approach differs from a 
typical insurance pricing approach because of its unique structure. 
 A proprietary insurance company would calculate the premium as the expected cost of 
claims plus the cost of servicing the capital that is held against the risk and which represents 
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the level of security that is being adopted by the company. PPF, of course, is not a proprietary 
model; its resources are the future levies that are raised – a sort of contingent capital – and it 
has no real basis for establishing a unit cost of capital. However the process of setting the 
aggregate levy requirements using stochastic methods that evaluate the risks and direct a 
level of pricing consistent with the Board’s risk tolerance or risk appetite is very similar to a 
proprietary model, albeit in conceptual terms. 
 The parallels continue into the division of levy between the 6,300 eligible schemes 
where the levy rates, which formerly were based on one year probabilities of default and are 
now closer to market rates that implicitly incorporate a cost of capital. These levies thus 
reflect the contribution to risk of individual schemes. Nevertheless it must be remembered 
that this stage of the process is essentially a levy-sharing exercise, not an individual risk-
pricing exercise. PPF does, however, monitor its levy amounts against the premium that 
would be charged by a commercial insurer with capital costs to bear.  
 The paper has also shed a light on the complexities of the risk landscape that must be 
factored into the levy pricing mechanism. PPF’s claims experience has typically been a 
steady flow of new claims, but the amounts vary markedly. Deficits inherited range from 
those counted in single millions of pounds right up to over half a billion pounds. PPF has yet 
to experience a sustained increase in claim frequency, although one is often predicted in 
connection with the economic recovery. The PPF is still vulnerable to an extremely large 
claim, albeit an unlikely one. Capturing these risks in a single model is challenging, and then 
the risk is also affected over the long term by the behaviors of scheme Trustees and indeed 
the changing landscape of regulation. Both factors must be considered either in a base case or 
in a sensitivity analysis. 
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Postscripts: Lessons from the U.K. experience 
 If I were to address what the U.S. pension protection regime might learn from its 
younger and much smaller counterpart in the United Kingdom, I would identify four areas to 
consider (with much humility): 
A levy that is consistent with the cost of risk. The ability to set a levy that is linked to the 
financial requirements of the Fund and is shared out among insured plans according to 
individual plan risk has helped maintain the PPF resilience throughout the global financial 
crisis. 
 In aggregate, the claims on the PPF, as measured by the Section 179 deficits of 
schemes entering the Fund, has represented 97% of the aggregate levy collected during PPF’s 
eight years of existence. The Fund has gained a measure of stakeholder acceptance for the 
levy through a clear financial objective and by linking the individual scheme levy to the risk 
posed to the PPF by that scheme. This is in contrast to the U.S. regime, in which the levy is 
based on scheme memberships and has not been sensitive to the level of risk in the system. 
 So far, the U.K. has been able to build a margin into its levies and has avoided a 
legacy issue of large inherited deficits becoming too great, or even irrecoverable. Were such a 
situation be allowed to develop, it would become harder to gain stakeholder acceptance to 
pay for both the prospective and the inherited risks. In the U.S., it seems that this position has 
been reached and that any move towards a risk-led approach to levies may have to be 
accompanied by measures to deal with the legacy issues.  
Clearly expressed financial objectives. As noted above, the PPF has set a very clear 
financial objective, namely, to be self-sufficient by 2030. This has provided a firm 
quantitative framework to evaluate levy and investment strategies, as well as providing a 
mechanism for informed stakeholder engagement with the Fund’s financial resilience. By 
contrast, the PBGC’s financial objectives are not as clear and its investment strategies have 
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oscillated at times, between the conflicting priorities of hedging downside liability risks and 
aggressive growth strategies. The PIMS model focuses on a 10 year time horizon and 
analyzes the funding level at that time, without having the firm context of knowing what the 
target is. In many ways this is understandable, but it is not conducive to good planning or 
stakeholder dialogue. 
 Given the almost overwhelming legacy issues faced by the PBGC today, it might 
seem that any strategy is destined to fail unless substantial external funding is acquired. In my 
opinion, this should not deter the PBGC from constructing a financial objective that accepts 
reality while attempting to make realistic improvements using levies and investment 
strategies. I am drawn to the concept of an objective that seeks to guarantee the pensions 
payable over a period of x years and to increase that period incrementally in each future year. 
Such a framework would accept the reality that the PBGC cannot guarantee all its current 
commitments without some future injection of funds. It would also encourage the protection 
of downside liability risks in order to make the guaranteed payments and allow some 
flexibility to take investment risks in the expectation that these will be rewarded and allow 
the funding position (and the guarantee period) to improve. This would further enable the 
modeling work of PIMS to become more relevant and enable better dialogue on the real 
issues facing the PBGC. 
Ownership and governance of investment risks.  The clarity that PPF has achieved through 
its governance arrangements means that ownership of, and appetite for, risks in general and 
investment risk in particular is well understood and highly transparent.  In particular, the 
PPF Board has set a budget for investment risk that is delegated through its investment 
committee to the executive and its external fund managers. The Fund has established a 
notional portfolio of low risk investments that replicate its liabilities and that is consistent 
with its valuation assumptions. This replicating portfolio forms the investment benchmark 
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from which performance and risk are measured. The investment committee devises a multi-
asset investment strategy to optimize long term performance against the benchmark whilst 
remaining within the Board’s risk tolerance. Generally this strategy will hedge away 
unrewarded risk and allocate money to a diversifying range of asset classes with their own 
benchmarks that collectively seek to outperform the replicating portfolio by a target of 1.8% 
per annum. The accountability for the collective performance of these strategic benchmarks 
lies with the investment committee. The execution strategies within each asset class and the 
risk and performance of the assets in relation to asset class-specific benchmarks are the 
responsibility of the in-house investment team and the external managers they select. 
 Such a structured approach paired with clear statements of risk appetite are not 
evident within the governance arrangements of PBGC. Investment performance is measured 
against a soft benchmark of a blend of equity and bond investments, but this benchmark is 
simply a comparator. It does not appear to feature in the roles and responsibilities of the 
various links in the investment chain, crucially, it bears no relation to the liabilities of PBGC.  
 One consequence of this is that the ownership and governance of the mismatching 
risks between assets and liabilities are not immediately clear. Yet the management of 
performance and risk within the whole investment area is likely to be compromised by 
insufficiently clear objectives. 
Model assumptions and limitations. The PPF has a comprehensive internal model that is 
used for risk analysis and strategy evaluation, but as with all such models, it has limitations 
and the users of such models should be aware of these limitations. In the case of the PPF, the 
Board owns the model assumptions and is therefore encouraged at a high level to be familiar 
with the key assumptions and their materiality. Members of the Board also undertake training 
on financial models and how they can engage with and challenge model outputs, for example 
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by applying tests of reasonableness. The main assumptions in the PPF model are also 
published each year within the PPF’s annual review of its funding strategy. 
 Good actuarial practice encourages the providers of actuarial information and model 
outputs to understand the purposes for which the information will be used. Where decisions 
are to be made or opinions formed from that information, then those assumptions material to 
the decision should be clearly stated and, where appropriate, sensitivities used to illustrate the 
effect of differences in the material assumptions. 
 Models such as that used by the PPF or the PIMS model used by PBGC can become 
victims of their own inherent complexity. Of necessity, there are many components such as 
the economic and market factors that influence investment performance and also insolvency 
rates, assumptions about behaviors such as scheme closures, buy outs, or pensions 
commutation, and regulatory effects. This makes it difficult to properly inform the users of 
the model about the limitations and sensitivities to changes in material assumptions. 
 A model’s utility as a practical tool is formed by the clarity of the purpose for which it 
is being used, the governance around its assumptions, and a clear understanding of its 
limitations and a quantification of its sensitivity to changes in key assumptions. A great deal 
of effort can go into the design, build, and the assumption-setting, and in many respects this 
is a continuous process of iteration. But unless there is clarity of purpose and a good sense of 
materiality, this effort can simply become a misplaced search for elusive perfection.
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• The PPF universe of eligible DB schemes comprises 6,300 pension schemes with 12 
million members and aggregate liabilities of £1tn, measured under the basis set in 
accordance with Section 179 of the Pensions Act 2004.  
• 550 pension schemes with, in total, over 150,000 members have transferred to the PPF. 
An additional 250 schemes with 150,000 members are in a PPF assessment period 
during which the scheme is assessed for PPF entry. 
• The PPF’s balance sheet has grown significantly to the point where, as at 31 March 
2013, an estimated £13 billion of assets are under direct PPF management, with a 
further £6 billion of assets managed by schemes that are in an assessment period. 
 
Figure 1. Key facts about the PPF (as at end March 2013). Source: PPF (2006-2013); PPF and The 
Pensions Regulator (2006-2013). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The PPF financial operating model. Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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Figure 3. Projected development of the age profile of PPF membership. Source: Author’s 
elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Funding margins for combined longevity and claims risk. Source: Author’s 
elaboration. 
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Figure 5. The internal model. Note: A third party economic scenario generator feeds two 
sub-modules that create consistent insolvency and exposure experiences respectively, 
combining to form distributions of PPF claims experience and balance sheet. Source: 
Author’s elaboration. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of balance sheet outcomes from the PPF’s 31 March 2012 base case. 
Source: PPF (2006-2013); PPF and The Pensions Regulator (2006-2013). 
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Figure 7. PPF levy formula 2012/2013. 
 
 
Risk based levy (RBL) = Underfunding (U) X Insolvency Risk (IR) X Levy 
Scaling Factor (LSF) 
 
Where 
 
U is the value of the scheme liabilities less the value of its assets and less any deficit 
reduction contribution made since the last valuation date. If U is negative and the 
scheme is in surplus then the RBL is zero. 
 
For the purposes of the above the assets and liabilities are stressed according to an 
adverse scenario to reflect investment risk. 
 
U may be further reduced if a contingent asset such as a bank or parental guarantee 
has been approved. 
 
RBL is capped at 0.75% of unstressed liabilities. 
 
IR is a rate ranging from 0.0018 for the strongest sponsors up to 0.04 for the weakest. 
There are 10 categories in total. 
 
LSF = 0.89 for 2012/2013  
 
Scheme Based Levy (SBL) = Liabilities (L) X Scheme Based Multiplier (SBM) 
 
Where: 
 
SBM = 0.000085 
 
Source: PPF (2006-2013); PPF and The Pensions Regulator (2006-2013). 
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Table 1 PPF Assets, Liabilities, Claims, and Levy Experience 
 
 
PPF Balance Sheet Development 
Financial Year 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 
 
12/13 
 
 
Assets (£m) 
 
2,086 4,409 5,554 9,330 12,257 14,043 16,513 18,898 
 
Liabilities (£m) 
 
2,429 5,018 6,071 10,560 11,863 13,366 15,444 17,906 
 
Funding  
Ratio 
86% 88% 91% 88% 103% 105% 107% 106% 
 
Claims in Year 
(£m) 
485 442 318 721 285 373 375 1,000 
 
Levy collection 
(£m) 
137 271 585 651 592 663 596 630 
 
Source: PPF (2006-2013); PPF and The Pensions Regulator (2006-2013). 
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Table 2 Sensitivity of Downside Risk and Probability of Success 
 
Scenario Probability of 
success (%) 
Downside risk (£bn) 
Base case as at 31st March 2012  
 
84 10 
Levy reduced by 10% 
 
82 11 
25 bps reduction in asset returns (excluding 
cash and government bonds) 
 
82 11 
Initial PPF funding reduced by 10 percentage 
points 
79 12 
Length of recovery plans increased by three 
years 
 
83 11 
Reduced funding owing to a 10% reduction in 
scheme technical provisions. 
79 15 
 
Source: PPF (2006-2013); PPF and The Pensions Regulator (2006-2013). 
 
 
 
 
